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ABSTRACT 
Jianxin Zhao: The Economics of Bank Cross-Firm Selling: The Value of Borrower Board 
Connectedness and Opacity 
(Under the direction of Wayne R. Landsman) 
 
This study provides evidence that banks value their existing borrowers’ board network 
because it can give banks an advantage in cross-selling services to other firms in the network.  I 
posit that banks gain an informational advantage from a common shared director between the 
existing borrower and firms in the borrower's network.  I find that if a bank has a lending 
relationship with a well-connected borrower, then the bank’s likelihood of winning loan business 
from a firm in the borrower’s board network increases.  I also find that banks are willing to 
compensate well-connected borrowers with larger board networks by offering lower loan spreads 
because these borrowers provide greater opportunities for their bank lenders to sell loans to firms 
in their networks.  Moreover, consistent with board networks providing connected banks with an 
informational advantage over other de novo lenders, I find that the probability of a connected 
bank winning loan business from a firm in its existing borrower’s network is higher if the firm is 
more informationally opaque.  As further evidence of a network-based information advantage, I 
also find that banks offer lower loan spreads to a well-connected borrower if firms in that 
borrower’s board network are on average more opaque.  This finding indicates that a borrower 
can benefit from the opacity of its connected firms via lower loan spreads. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Firms are connected through complex social and economic networks.  One important 
source of connectedness is board networks formed by shared board directorates across firms. 
Individuals who are executives or directors at two or more companies become conduits for 
information, knowledge, and experiences that travel across the active links in the board network 
(e.g., Stuart and Yim, 2010; Chiu, Teoh, and Tian, 2012; Larcker, So, and Wang, 2013).  
Whereas recent studies suggest that board networks can function as a means for information 
transmission and play an important role in the financial markets, there is little research 
examining whether information flows through board networks can affect relative information 
asymmetries across potential lenders and thereby influence competition among bank lenders in 
the private lending market.  I investigate the extent to which bank lenders are able to exploit their 
existing borrowers’ board networks to increase their chances of winning loan business from 
firms in such networks (hereafter connected firms).  Further, I examine whether banks 
compensate well-connected borrowers for access to the cross-firm selling opportunities provided 
by their board networks, and whether the value of a borrower’s board network to a bank is 
increasing in the opacity of firms in the network. 
Bank lenders potentially have multiple advantages over other de novo lenders when 
competing for making loans to firms in their existing borrower’s board network, including access 
to the connected firms’ boards and managers and better information about the connected firms’ 
credit worthiness.  Common directors, who serve as board members in a borrower and its 
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connected firms, can act as informal financial intermediaries between the borrower’s bank and 
these connected firms, which provide banks with information that enhances their competitive 
advantage relative to other potential lenders.  In this regard, Garmaise and Moskowitz (2003) 
analyzes a model in which informal financial intermediaries (e.g., brokers) and lenders play a 
cooperative repeated game.  Lenders cooperate with informal financial intermediaries by 
expending effort to expedite the evaluation of loan applications made by the intermediaries’ 
clients, which results in more service fees to the intermediaries.  In return, the informal financial 
intermediary advises its clients to seek a loan from the lender.   
Building on the cooperation theory in Garmaise and Moskowitz (2003), I posit that there 
is a form of cooperation between a bank and a borrower with a well-connected board (i.e., a 
board with directors that sit on the boards of many other firms).  Specifically, the borrower’s 
directors, who also serve as board members in its connected firms, can help the bank win future 
lending business from its connected firms because they can act as informal financial 
intermediaries.  In return, the bank lender cooperates with the borrower by offering better loan 
contract terms.  Hence, I predict that if a bank has a lending relationship with a well-connected 
borrower, then the bank’s likelihood of winning the loan business from a firm in the borrower’s 
board network increases.  State differently, if a bank has made a loan to a potential borrower’s 
connected firm before, then the bank becomes a connected bank of that borrower and thus the 
bank’s chances of winning the loan business from that borrower increases.  In addition, I predict 
that the well-connected borrower is rewarded with more favorable loan contract terms as 
reflected by a lower cost of debt. 
To illustrate, Barbara Bass served on the board of both Starbucks Corp and Bebe Stores 
Inc. from 2000 to 2011.  In 2005, Starbucks received a syndicated loan from Wells Fargo.  Thus, 
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in years 2005–2011 (but not 2000–2004), Wells Fargo may have a connection with Bebe Stores 
because Wells Fargo is connected to Bebe Stores via a common director.  In other words, Wells 
Fargo becomes a connected bank of Bebe.  Director Bass may act as an informal financial 
intermediary between Wells Fargo and Bebe Stores, which could increase Wells Fargo’s 
likelihood of winning loan business from Bebe Stores during 2005–2011.  In return, Starbucks 
may have received a lower cost of debt or other favorable loan terms from Wells Fargo on its 
2005 syndicated loan.  
To analyze empirically whether having made a loan to a borrower’s connected firm 
increases a bank’s likelihood of winning loan business from that borrower when competing with 
other banks, I use and augment data from Boardex to retrieve all the connections between firms 
through shared common directors and Dealscan to retrieve loan information for the sample 
period between 2000 and 2015.  Following prior studies such as Bharath et al. (2008) and 
Hellmann et al. (2008), I directly model a firm’s lender-choice problem in which a firm selects 
its lender from a pool of potential banks.  Specifically, in my lender choice model, for each loan, 
a borrower has a choice set of all possible bank lenders.  My empirical model examines whether 
a potential bank lender’s likelihood of winning the loan business depends on whether the 
potential bank lender has made previous loans to a firm connected to the borrower, controlling 
for other determinants of lender choices, including the potential bank lender’s prior lending 
relationship with the borrower, the bank’s market power and reputation, the bank’s industry 
specialization, and the geographic proximity between the bank and the borrower. 
I find that having a prior lending relationship with a borrower’s connected firm 
significantly increases a bank’s chance of becoming the lender for that borrower.  Specifically, 
conditional on having made a loan to a borrower’s connected firm, a bank’s probability of 
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granting a loan to that borrower more than doubles from approximately 1.6% to 4.5%.  I include 
loan fixed effects in the regressions as controls for various sources of observed and unobserved 
heterogeneity in lender choice and to minimize correlated omitted variable (and related 
endogeneity) concerns.  This fixed effect structure implies that my analysis provides within-loan 
estimates for the key variables of interest, eliminating all common determinants of lender choice 
within a loan, including firms’ and actual/realized lenders’ characteristics.  
Next, I examine whether borrowers with well-connected boards are compensated by bank 
lenders for their role in facilitating the bank’s efforts to win loan business from other firms in the 
borrowers’ board network.  Analogous to the cooperation game in Garmaise and Moskowitz 
(2003), a bank can curry favor with a well-connected borrower by offering favorable loan 
contracts in return for their cooperation in increasing the bank’s likelihood of subsequently 
winning loan business from the borrower’s connected firms.  I test this prediction by 
constructing a measure of board connectedness for each borrower and by comparing loan spreads 
between borrowers with a well-connected board and borrowers with a less well-connected board.  
I find that borrowers with a well-connected board have a lower cost of debt, even after 
controlling for credit risk and past and future performance.  Specifically, loan spreads decrease 
by approximately 10% when the firm’s board connectedness ranking moves from the bottom 
quintile to the top quintile.  This finding is consistent with well-connected borrowers being 
rewarded with better loan contracts because they provide greater potential for cross-firm selling. 
Next, I analyze the mechanism through which a bank that previously made a loan to a 
potential borrower’s connected firm is more likely to win the loan from that new borrower.  One 
important mechanism is that common directors, who link the new borrower and its connected 
firms, can serve as information intermediaries for the bank.  Specifically, the intermediation role 
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of the common directors can improve information flow and communication between the new 
borrower and the bank, and allow the bank to gain private information that provides the bank 
with a comparative advantage when competing with other de novo banks.  The private 
information can include hard information, such as borrowers’ financial projections and plans for 
acquisitions or dispositions, as well as softer information, such as observations about a 
management team’s abilities and honesty (Petersen, 2004; Bushman, Williams, and Wittenberg-
Moerman, forthcoming).  Such private information would plausibly have higher value to a bank 
in situations where borrower opacity obscures the firm’s fundamentals and makes it more 
difficult for other de novo lenders to assess the borrower’s creditworthiness.  
This analysis builds on Rajan (1992) and Hauswald and Marquez (2006), which model 
the competition between an informed bank and less informed banks to supply loan business to a 
risky borrower.  The models show that informed banks have a competitive advantage in winning 
the loan by virtue of their information advantage.  In my setting, I designate as informed lenders 
banks that have a lending relationship with the borrower’s connected firm, where common 
directors can serve as information channels for private information about the borrower.  Less 
informed banks are those without privileged access to the borrower.  The greater is opacity in the 
borrowing firm’s activities, the greater is the relative information advantage of the informed 
lenders, which in turn implies a greater competitive advantage.  As a result, I predict that an 
informed bank’s probability of winning the loan increases with a borrower’s informational 
opacity.  I find evidence consistent with this prediction: the probability of a connected bank 
lender winning the loan from a new borrower is higher when the borrower’s financial reporting 
is more opaque. 
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Building on this result, I next examine whether the average opacity of firms in a well-
connected borrower’s board network increases the value of the network to a connected bank by 
increasing cross-firm selling potential.  If the value of a board network is increasing in opacity, I 
expect banks to compensate well-connected borrowers that have opaque networks by offering 
lower loan spreads.  Consistent with this expectation, I find that the loan spread discount for an 
existing well-connected borrower is greater if firms in that borrower’s board network are on 
average more opaque.  Overall, these findings are consistent with common directors serving as 
information intermediaries between the connected bank and the borrower and allowing the 
connected bank to gain an information advantage when competing for the borrower’s loans. 
One caveat regarding the inferences I draw from my findings is that, as with much of the 
work on social networks, it is difficult to definitively establish causality.  Directors and firms do 
not match randomly.  Prior studies suggest that because board members are chosen, board 
characteristics therefore are endogenously related to firm outcomes (e.g., Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 2003).  As a result, a concern for my analysis is that the presence of a director on two 
firms’ boards could reflect an underlying similarity between the two firms, and it could be this 
commonality that causes each to select the same bank lenders.  This is effectively a correlated 
omitted variable problem, in which a potentially omitted factor is anything that both determines 
director matching to firms and is correlated with a firm’s propensity to select certain bank 
lenders.  To address this problem, I explicitly include controls for time-variant firm 
heterogeneity through loan fixed effects, time-invariant bank heterogeneity through bank fixed 
effects and time-varying bank characteristics through observable control variables (e.g., market 
power) in my lender-choice model.  However, even after including these controls, an omitted 
variable can still operate at the firm and bank pair level, e.g., because the firm and bank operate 
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in the same geographic region.  To mitigate this concern, I exploit my data structure and include 
firm-bank fixed effects in the lender-choice model.  In addition, I include controls for industry- 
and geography-proximity effects because these are two dimensions along which bank lending 
activities can cluster and board service is determined.  My inferences are robust to using these 
fixed effects structure and control variables.  Further, although I cannot fully rule out similarity 
between two connected firms as an alternative explanation for my findings, findings from the 
cross-sectional tests mitigate this concern.  That is, the findings showing that borrower opacity 
increases the probability of a connected bank winning the loan and that connected banks offer 
lower loan spreads to well-connected borrowers with more opaque networks are inconsistent 
with this alternative explanation. 
This study makes several contributions to the literature.  First, prior research on board 
networks suggests that a board’s social network is beneficial (e.g., Larcker et al., 2013; Houston 
et al., 2015).  However, the mechanism through which the board network creates value is not yet 
well understood.  This study complements this literature by documenting one mechanism for 
value creation—cross-firm selling potential for the firm’s bank lenders provided by board 
connectedness.  My findings suggest that board connectedness benefits not only borrowers, but 
also their bank lenders.  In addition, although prior studies suggest that board networks can 
function as a means of information transmission, this paper is among the first to provide direct 
evidence on the information intermediation role of common directors.  Second, this paper 
extends the extant accounting literature relating the quality of accounting information to debt 
contracting (e.g., Armstrong, Guay, and Weber, 2010; Dechow, Ge, and Schrand, 2010).  
Although much of this literature suggests that the quality of a firm’s financial reporting 
positively affects its debt contracting outcomes, this paper adopts a contrasting perspective on 
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the issue by considering the possibility that the opacity of a well-connected borrowers’ network 
can be valuable to a bank and that the borrower can benefit from the opacity of its connected 
firms via lower loan spreads.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents prior research that 
motivates my analyses and the hypotheses development.  Section 3 presents the research design, 
section 4 describes the sample and data, and section 5 presents the results.  Section 6 provides 
concluding remarks.
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CHAPTER 2: RELATED LITERATURE AND PREDICTIONS 
 
2.1. Borrower board connectedness and bank cross-firm selling 
Sociologists have long viewed each company’s board as a node in a firm-to-firm network 
that arises because a large fraction of public company directors are either directors or executives 
of other firm (e.g., Stuart and Yim, 2010).  Individuals who are executives or directors at two or 
more companies become conduits for information, knowledge, and experiences that travel across 
the active links in the board network.  Recent studies suggest that board networks play an 
important role in the financial markets.  Larcker, So, and Wang (2013) documents a positive 
association between board connectedness and firm performance, and posits that the positive 
relation is attributable to networks providing better access to information.  Several studies 
suggest that board networks function as the transmission route for the diffusion of financial 
practices.  For example, board networks contribute to the dissemination of the stock option 
backdating practice (Bizjak et al., 2009) and earnings management (Chiu et al., 2012).  Board 
members and their social networks influence which companies become targets in change-of-
control transactions in the private equity market (Stuart and Yim, 2010).  I build on these insights 
and investigate the extent to which bank lenders are able to exploit their existing borrowers’ 
board networks to increase their chances of winning loan business from firms in such networks. 
When a bank makes a syndicated loan to a firm, the ongoing interactions between the 
bank and the firm during the syndication process and over the life of the loan provide the bank 
and firm directors opportunities to build informal relationships with each other.  When these  
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directors also simultaneously serve as board members in other firms, their relationship with a 
bank allows these directors to act as informal financial intermediaries between the bank and 
other firms in the directors’ networks.  The role of these directors as an informal financial 
intermediary can increase the bank’s likelihood of winning the loan business.1  This line of 
reasoning is closely related to Garmaise and Moskowitz (2003), which presents a model of a 
general informal financial network that demonstrates that informal financial intermediaries, who 
do not supply loans, can facilitate their clients’ access to financing through informal relationships 
with lenders.  In the study’s model, informal financial intermediaries and lenders play a 
cooperative repeated game.  Lenders cooperate with informal financial intermediaries by 
expending effort to expedite the evaluation of loan applications made by the informal financial 
intermediary’s clients, this results in more service fees to the intermediaries.  In return, the 
informal financial intermediary advises its clients to seek a loan from the lender. 
Building on the cooperation theory in Garmaise and Moskowitz (2003), I posit that there 
is a form of cooperation between a bank and a firm with a well-connected board, i.e., a board 
with directors that sit on the boards of many other firms.  Specifically, when a bank syndicates a 
loan to a firm with a well-connected board, the bank cooperates with the firm by offering better 
loan contract terms.  In return, the firm’s directors, who also sit on other firms’ boards, can help 
the bank win future lending business from those firms because these common directors act as 
informal financial intermediaries between the bank and the connected firms.  In section 2.2, I 
investigate the mechanism through which the bank can win the loan business from the connected 
firms.  Specifically, I analyze whether the bank gains privileged information about the connected 
firms, which gives the bank comparative advantage over other de novo lenders when competing 
                                                          
1 As advisers to senior management, directors generally play an important role in major corporate decisions, 
including lending decisions (e.g., Engelberg, Gao, and Parsons, 2012). 
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for winning loans from these connected firms.  One important reason that the well-connected 
firm’ directors are willing to act in the interest of the firm and thus help the firm’s bank is their 
reputational concern.  Ample evidence suggests that directors seek to develop their reputation to 
gain more board seats and thereby obtain prestige, power, and compensation (e.g., Coles and 
Hoi, 2003; Lel and Miller, 2015; Levit and Malenko, 2016).2  To sum up, if a bank has made a 
loan to a new borrower’s connected firm before, then the bank’s chance of winning the loan 
business from that borrower increases.  My first hypothesis is the following: 
H1: Having a prior lending relationship with a borrower’s connected firm increases a 
bank’s likelihood of providing a loan to that borrower. 
My next prediction considers whether banks compensate well-connected borrowers for 
their role in facilitating the banks’ efforts to win loan business from other firms in the borrowers’ 
board network.  As part of the cooperation game in Garmaise and Moskowitz (2003), a bank can 
curry favor with a well-connected borrower by offering favorable loan contracts in return for 
their cooperation in increasing the bank’s likelihood of subsequently winning loan business from 
the borrower’s connected firms.  Accordingly, my second hypothesis is: 
H2: Borrowers with a well-connected board (i.e., well-connected borrowers) can obtain 
loans at a lower spread. 
This prediction is consistent with Ivashina and Kovner (2008), which examines the 
impact of leveraged buyout firms’ bank relationships on the terms of their syndicated loans.  The 
study suggests that bank pricing decisions take fees across all products into account and thus the 
potential for additional business from the leveraged buyout firms’ other investments would 
                                                          
2 Another potential reason that the common directors have incentives to help the connected bank is that the directors 
may benefit directly from their relationship with the connected bank.  For example, they might receive special loan 
terms if they borrow from the connected bank.  
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improve the terms for any given loan.  My study complements Ivashina and Kovner (2008) by 
examining whether banks offer favorable loan terms to a well-connected borrower to curry favor 
with the borrower to help the bank sell loans to the borrower’s connected firms. 
Whereas my study focuses on bank cross-firm selling, there is an extensive banking 
literature that focuses on banks’ incentives to cross-sell different products to the same firm.  For 
example, a number of studies examine how a bank’s past lending relationships with a firm affect 
the bank’s chance of becoming underwriter of the firm’s debt and equity.  Yasuda (2005) 
examines the impact of prior lending relationships on the choice of debt underwriter and finds 
that past lending relationships are associated with a significantly higher probability of securing 
the debt underwriting business.  Drucker and Puri (2005) focuses exclusively on seasoned equity 
offerings and reports that concurrent lending—a loan six months before or six months after the 
issue—is associated with a higher likelihood of winning the underwriting business.  Bharath et 
al. (2007) finds that prior lending relationships are associated with a significantly higher 
probability of winning underwriting business for initial public offerings.  Instead of examining 
the relation between prior lending relationship and the choice of underwriter, Hellmann Lindsey 
and Puri (2008) considers the relation between a bank’s venture capital investments and its 
subsequent lending.  The study finds that having a prior relationship with a firm in the venture 
capital market increases a bank’s chance of subsequently granting a loan to that firm.  My study 
builds on this literature by investigating the extent to which the bank lenders exploit their 
existing borrowers’ board networks to sell loans to other firms in such networks. 
2.2. Bank cross-firm selling, borrower board connectedness and borrower opacity 
In section 2.1, I predict that a bank’s chance of winning a loan from a borrower increases 
if the bank previously made loans to the borrower’s connected firm.  I term those banks as 
13 
 
connected banks.  An explanation for this prediction is that common directors, who link the 
borrower and its connected firms, act as informal financial intermediaries for the bank.  The 
question arises as to whether the intermediation role of common directors is associated with the 
ability of the connected bank to gain privileged information regarding the borrower, which 
provides the bank a comparative advantage when competing with other lenders.  I analyze this 
question in this section.   
Building relationships with common directors potentially enables a bank to gain 
extensive inside knowledge of the borrowers operations and to develop private channels of 
communication with the managers.3  The inside information gained by the bank can include hard 
information, such as financial projections and plans for acquisitions or dispositions, as well as 
softer information, such as observations about a management team’s abilities and honesty 
(Petersen, 2004).  In addition, the inside information can be new information not available to the 
bank from other sources, or it could be a signal that confirms, corroborates, or substantiates noisy 
information that the bank received from a different source (Bushman, Williams, and Wittenberg-
Moerman, forthcoming).  In the latter case, the common directors can, for example, confirm soft 
information the bank obtained elsewhere about the borrower, or allow the bank to filter noise 
from signals received from other sources. 
Because of this informational advantage, the bank has a comparative advantage over 
outside lenders without such connections.  Thus, when the connected bank lenders compete with 
other lenders to arrange a loan for the borrower, de novo unconnected lenders face higher 
adverse selection risk than connected bank lenders because of their pre-bidding informational 
                                                          
3 Although securities law prohibits investors from obtaining unequal access to firms’ confidential information in the 
equity market, private debt markets are not subject to such securities laws.  As a result, investors in the debt market, 
i.e., lenders, have significant access to borrowers’ private information. 
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disadvantage.  This line of reasoning is motivated by Rajan (1992) and Hauswald and Marquez 
(2006), which provide the theoretical underpinning for the tests that follow.4 
Rajan (1992) and Hauswald and Marquez (2006) model competitive dynamics in private 
lending markets in a setting where an informed (inside) bank competes for a borrower’s loan 
with less informed (outside) banks.  The models assume that the informed bank acquires private 
information through its privileged access to the borrower, whereas an uninformed bank does not 
have such access. 5  The models assume that the informed bank has superior (or perfect) 
information about whether the firm will succeed or fail, and that an uninformed bank has no 
private information.  The informed bank can use its ability to distinguish good from bad credit 
risks to adjust its lending strategy accordingly and thus to subject less informed lenders to 
problems of adverse selection.  As a result, an uninformed bank will bid for the loan less 
aggressively by offering loans less frequently.   
Hauswald and Marquez (2006) also shows that the probability that a borrower receives a 
loan offer from an uninformed bank decreases in the informational advantage of the informed 
bank.  Specifically, because the improved informational advantage increases the threat of adverse 
selection to the uninformed bank, the uninformed bank will bid less aggressively and thus is less 
likely to win the loan contract.  This theory leads to the prediction that the probability of an 
informed bank winning the loan from the borrower is higher when the informed bank’s 
informational advantage is higher.  Assuming that the informed bank would have a greater 
informational advantage relative to the uninformed bank if the borrower’s information 
                                                          
4 These models are used by Bushman, Williams, and Wittenberg-Moerman (forthcoming) to examine the 
informational role of the media in private lending.   
 
5 In Rajan (1992), the informed bank is a relationship bank that has made loans to the borrower and thus can acquire 
private information.  In Hauswald and Marquez (2006), the informed bank is a bank that is located in close 
geographic proximity to the borrower and the short distance between the bank and borrower allows the bank to 
acquire private information. 
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environment is more opaque, the probability of the informed bank granting a loan is increasing in 
the borrower’s information opacity.  In my context, I designate as informed lenders banks that 
have a lending relationship with the borrower’s connected firm where common directors can 
serve as information channels for private information about the borrower.  Therefore I predict 
that the effect of the bank’s prior lending relationship with the borrower’s connected firm on the 
likelihood of granting a loan to the borrower is stronger if the borrower is more opaque.  
I further predict that the loan spread discount for an existing well-connected borrower is 
greater if firms in that borrower’s board network are more informationally opaque.  As discussed 
above, if firms in the borrower’s board network are more opaque, then the borrower’s bank 
would have higher probability of winning the loan business from these firms in the network.  
Therefore, the board network of the borrower would be more valuable to the bank lender, and the 
bank would compensate the well-connected borrower with lower spreads.   
This prediction is related to the literature on the role of financial reporting quality in debt 
contracting.  Prior studies primarily show that a firm’s information quality is positively related to 
its debt contracting outcomes such as cost of debt (e.g., Ball et al., 2008; Bharath et al., 2008; 
Graham et al., 2008; Zhang, 2008). 6  My paper adopts a contrasting perspective on the issue by 
considering the possibility that a well-connected borrower’s cost of debt is related to the 
information quality of firms in its board network and that the borrower can benefit from the 
opacity of firms in its board network.  The underlying mechanism for the benefit is that the 
opacity of the connected firms provides greater cross-firm selling potential for the borrower’s 
bank and therefore is valuable to the bank.  This mechanism is distinct from those studied in the 
extant literature, including agency costs and renegotiation costs (e.g., Armstrong et al., 2010). 
                                                          
6 See Armstrong et al. (2010) for detailed review of this literature. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
I organize the discussion of research design into three subsections.  Section 3.1 describes 
the network measures used in empirical tests.  Section 3.2 discusses the regression model that I 
use to examine whether having a prior lending relationship with a borrower’s connected firms 
increases a bank’s probability of granting a loan to that borrower.  Section 3.3 explains the 
regression model for testing whether a borrower with a well-connected board is rewarded with a 
lower cost of debt.  Section 3.4 presents the regression model for analyzing whether the 
connected bank’s likelihood of granting a loan to a new borrower is higher if the borrower is 
more informationally opaque.  Section 3.5 explains the regression model for testing whether the 
loan pricing discount for a well-connected borrower is higher if firms in the borrower’s board 
network are more informationally opaque. 
3.1. Connection measures 
In my study, two firms are linked or connected if they share at least one common 
director.  To conduct my tests, I create two different types of connection measures based on 
director network or experience.  My first connection measure relates to board connectedness.  I 
define Aggregate_Connectedness, which is the total number of links to outside firms to which a 
given firm is connected by sharing its directors.  For example if a firm has two directors, one of 
which sits on 4 other firms’ boards and antoher of which sits on 3 non-overlapping firms’ boards, 
then Aggregate_Connectedness equals 7.  This is a general measure of firm’s connectedness in 
the board network.  One drawback of this connectedness measure is that larger firms tend to have  
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larger boards, giving rise to a mechanical positive association between firm size and the board 
connectedness measure.  Therefore, following Larcker et al. (2013), I create a ranked version of 
the connectedness measure that reduces the association with size.  Specifically, for each year, I 
rank all firms into quintiles based on total assets.  Within each total asset quintile, I sort firms 
into quintiles based on Aggregate_Connectedness, where the highest (lowest) value of 
connectedness is assigned a value of four (zero).  I further deflate this connectedness measure by 
four, so that the range of this variable is between 0 and 1.  I term this connectedness measure 
Connectedness.  The use of quintiles ranks reduces the influence of extreme values, eases the 
interpretation of the regression results, and provides a non-parametric method to mitigate the 
impact of firm size on the connectedness measure.  To further mitigate the effect of size, I 
include other size proxies in the regressions such as total asset and board size. 
The second measure relates to whether a bank has a lending relationship with a given 
borrower’s connected firms.  This variable, ,_ i mConnected Bank  is an indicator variable that 
equals one if any of firm i’s directors serve on the board of a second or more firm that has a 
lending relationship with bank m.  I use ,_ i mConnected Bank  to test H1, i.e., whether having a 
prior lending relationship with a borrower’s connected firm increases a bank’s likelihood of 
providing a loan to that borrower. 
3.2. The effect of prior lending relationship with borrower’s connected firm on likelihood of 
being chosen as the lead bank 
In this section, I develop the empirical analysis I use to test the hypothesis that having a 
prior lending relationship with a borrower’s connected firm increases a bank’s likelihood of 
providing a loan to that borrower.  Following prior research such as Hellmann, Lindsey, and Puri 
(2008) and Cai, Saunders, and Steffen (2016),  I directly model a firm’s lender-choice problem 
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for its syndicated loans and evaluate the effect of prior lending relationships with connected 
firms on the choice of lenders.  I focus on syndicated loans because they are the dominant way in 
which firms obtain loans from banks and other financial institutions.7  Because the lead arranger 
bank is the key lender in a syndicated loan, I focus on the firm’s choice of lead banks rather than 
all lenders (I use the terms lead arranger and lead bank interchangeably).8  
To evaluate the effect of prior lending relationships with the borrower’s connected firm, 
for each loan, I focus on any bank m’s likelihood of winning the loan business as the lead 
arranger from borrower i at time t.  I need to consider both realized matches in the loan market 
(where a specific bank grants a loan to a specific firm), and unrealized matches (where a specific 
bank does not grant a loan to a specific firm).  This implies that the unit of analysis is the 
potential pairing between a firm and a bank at a specific time.  That is, I need to consider not 
only the realized pairs of firms and banks but also those cases in which there is potential to pair 
even if the pairing does not actually happen.  The number of potential lead banks is quite large, 
and a handful of banks account for the bulk of lending.  Therefore, following Sufi (2007) and Cai 
et al. (2016), I limit the analysis to the top 100 lead banks in my sample because such banks 
account for 99% of the aggregate market share.  For each loan I create a choice set of 100 
potential lead banks, thereby creating 100 loan-bank pairs.  I estimate the following linear 
probability regression model:  
                                                          
7 Syndicated loans are large deals that typically require board approval.  The average loan size in my sample is 
approximately $500 million.  
 
8 In contrast to a traditional bank loan, which involves a single lender, a syndicated loan involves a group of lenders.  
The loan is originated by a lead bank (i.e., lead arranger) which sells pieces of the loan to other participant banks.  
Although the lead bank retains only part of the loan, it acts as the manager for the loan with primary responsibility 
for ex ante due diligence and for ex post monitoring of the borrower.  Participant banks depend on the information 
collected by the lead bank. 
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, , , 1 , ,_ _  i m k t i m tRealized Lender Connected Bank Controls LoanFEα β ε= + + + +    (1) 
, , ,_ i m k tRealized Lender is an indicator variable that equals one if borrower i selects bank m as the 
lead arranger/bank in loan k that is originated in month t and zero otherwise.  My central 
independent variable is , ,_ i m tConnected Bank , which is an indicator variable that equals one if 
bank m has originated a loan to the borrower’s connected firm prior to the month t and during the 
period in which the connection is active, and zero otherwise.  As noted earlier, a borrower’s 
connected firms are other firms that share directorates with firm i at time t.9  If a bank’s prior 
lending relationship with a borrower’s connected firm is associated with an increase (decrease, 
no change) in the bank’s likelihood of originating a loan to the borrower, then I predict 1 0β >
( 1 10,  0β β< = ). 
Based on prior literature, I also include controls for other variables that determine bank 
m’s likelihood of originating a loan to a borrower (e.g., Cai et al., 2016).  The first control, 
, ,_ _ i m tPrior lending relationship , a proxy for direct bank to borrower relationships, is an 
indicator variable for whether bank m has originated any loans to the borrower prior to month t.  
Inclusion of , ,_ _ i m tPrior lending relationship  serves as a control for effects of prior relationships 
between the borrower and bank m.10  Market_Share is the market share of bank m as a lead 
arranger in the US syndicated loan market during the twelve months prior to month t, and is a 
proxy for the bank’s reputation and market size or power.  Industry_Specialization is the loan 
portfolio weights for each bank m in each industry specialization category, which I measure 
                                                          
9 Borrower i may begin to share directorates with connected firm j several years before the month t, and this 
connection could last several years after the month t.  In other words, connections are essentially predetermined. 
 
10 Untabulated findings reveal that the inferences remain the same if I exclude lenders who have a direct lending 
relationship with the borrower. 
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based on 2-digit SIC.  I include it as a proxy for bank m specialization in the borrower’s industry.  
Same_Region is an indicator variable that equals one if the headquarters of borrower and bank m 
are located in the same region (i.e., the same 3-digit Zip code), and zero otherwise.  I use this 
variable as a proxy for the geographic proximity between bank m and the borrower.  LoanFE is a 
vector of loan fixed effects, which are included as controls for various sources of observed and 
unobserved heterogeneity in lender choice and to minimize correlated omitted variable (and 
related endogeneity) concerns.  This fixed effect structure implies that my analysis provides 
within-loan estimates for the key variable of interest, Connected_Bank.  That is, the loan fixed 
effects eliminate all common determinants of lender choice within a loan.  For a given loan, all 
variables that do not vary across observations (loan-bank pairs) are subsumed by the fixed 
effects.  As a result, I omit all firm-specific, loan-specific and lead bank specific variables and 
time fixed effects in the regression.  Standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust and clustered at 
the firm level.  
3.3. The effect of board connectedness on loan pricing 
In this section, I develop the empirical analysis I use to test the hypothesis of whether 
banks compensate firms with a well-connected board by offering better loan contract terms as 
reflected by lower loan spreads.  To examine the effect of board connectedness on loan pricing, I 
estimate the following regression model:  
1 1  it itLoanSpread Connectedness Controls FirmFE YearFEα β ε−= + + + + +                  (2) 
The dependent variable, LoanSpread, is loan spread based on the all-in-drawn spreads over 
LIBOR at issue date for loans issued to firm i in year t.  Because loan spreads are highly skewed, 
following prior studies (e.g., Graham et al., 2008; Chava et al., 2009), I measure LoanSpread as 
the natural logarithm of the actual loan spread.  The central independent variable is 
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Connectedness.11  If board connectedness is associated with lower (higher, no change) loan 
spreads, then I predict 1 0β < ( 1 10,  0β β> = ).  Since larger board and older firms are likely to 
have more aggregate connections, I also include controls for board size (Board_Size) and firm 
age (Age).  FirmFE and YearFE are firm and year fixed effects. 
Eq. (2) also includes a set of control variables for a variety of firm- and loan-specific 
characteristics suggested by prior research to affect loan spread.  The firm characteristics include 
return on assets, ROA; the tangibility of firm’s asset, Tangible, the debt-to asset-ratio, Leverage; 
firm size as measured by the natural logarithm of total assets, Log_asset,  and a set of indicator 
variables corresponding to each of 22 possible credit ratings (e.g., AAA, AA+, AA, etc.).12  Loan 
characteristics include revolver lines, Revolver; term loan B or below, TermLoanB; presence of 
performance pricing provisions, Performance_pricing; the natural logarithm of loan dollar 
amount in millions, LoanAmt; the loan term in months, Maturity; the number of financial 
covenants, NCOV; an indicator variable that equals one if a loan is secured and zero otherwise, 
Securdum; and a set of 30 indicator variables for loan purpose, e.g., whether a loan is used to 
finance an acquisition or whether a loan is used to execute a leveraged buyout.  All firm-level 
variables are measured as of the most recent quarterly financial reporting date.  The appendix 
provides details of all variable definitions.  I cluster standard errors at the firm level. 
 
 
 
                                                          
11 Untabulated finings reveal that the references reported in the paper remain the same if I use 
Aggregate_Connectedness.  
 
12 These variables also include an indicator for whether a firm has a credit rating. 
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3.4.  The effect of borrower information opacity on a connected bank’s likelihood of 
winning a loan 
In this section, I test the prediction that the effect of a bank’s prior lending relationship 
with a borrower’s connected firm on the likelihood of granting a loan to the borrower is stronger 
if the borrower is more opaque.  I estimate the following regression model: 
, , , 1 , , 2 ,
3 , ,
_ _
                                  _  
i m k t m i t i t
m i t
Realized Lender Connected Bank Opacity
Connected Bank Opacity Controls LoanFE
α β β
β ε
= + + +
× + + +
 (3) 
 Eq. (3) modifies Eq. (1) by including a measure of financial reporting opacity, Opacity, and its 
interactions with the central independent variable, Connected_Bank.  To create this financial 
reporting opacity measure, I borrow from Ball, Bushman, and Vasvari (2008) and Dou (2012), 
which develop a transparency measure, the debt-contracting value measure of a borrower’s 
accounting information, DCV.  The DCV measure reflects the inherent ability of firms’ public 
accounting information to reflect credit quality.  DCV is the Somers’ D-statistic derived from the 
explanatory power of accounting variables (i.e., earnings, leverage, equity book value and 
interest coverage) in an industry-specific probit model of firm credit ratings and ranges from 
zero—low transparency—to one—high transparency.  As such, DCV reflects the inherent ability 
of firms’ accounting amounts to capture credit quality measured at the industry rather than the 
firm level (see Appendix for details).  I multiply DCV by –1 such that a high value of DCV 
indicates an opaque financial reporting system.  Further, I rank DCV into deciles, then divide the 
resulting measure by nine to convert the decile rank to a zero to one range.  This procedure 
allows me to more easily interpret coefficients in my empirical tests.  If a borrower’s opacity 
increases a connected bank’s likelihood of winning the loan business from that borrower, then I 
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predict the coefficient on the two-way interaction term, Connected_Bank Opacity, is positive (
3 0β > ).  
 I use DCV, a measure of financial statement transparency, rather than equity bid-ask 
spread or analysts’ coverage as our measure of transparency for several reasons.  First, whereas 
DCV relates specifically to the credit market, equity bid-ask spread and analysts’ coverage relate 
primarily to the equity market.  Second, DCV is particularly relevant to the credit markets at the 
time of loan initiation because accounting information is the primary source of information 
lenders use when they initiate loans.  In this regard, prior studies provide consistent evidence that 
accounting information plays an important role in the design of debt contracts (e.g., Ball et al., 
2008; Armstrong et al., 2010; Amiram, 2013; Amiram et al., 2016). 
3.5. The effect of information opacity and loan pricing 
In this section, I test the prediction that the loan spread discount for an existing well-
connected borrower is greater if firms in that borrower’s board network are more opaque.  I 
estimate the following regression: 
1 2 ,
3 ,
_
                          _  
it it i t
it i t
LoanSpread Connectedness Opacity Net
Connectedness Opacity Net Controls FirmFE YearFE
α β β
β ε
= + + +
× + + + +
 (4) 
Eq. (4) modifies Eq. (2) by including a measure of network opacity for the borrower, 
Opacity_Net, and its interactions with the central independent variable, Connectedness.  To 
create this financial reporting opacity measure for the borrower’s board network, I calculate the 
average DCV value for all firms in the borrowers’ board network.13  I then multiply this average 
DCV  by –1 such that a high value of DCV indicates an opaque financial reporting system.  
                                                          
13 The calculation of Opacity_Net requires borrowers to have a least one firm in their board network. As a result, 
borrowers without board networks are excluding from the sample used to estimate Eq. (4).  
×
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Observations that are in the top quintile of this transformed average DCV value are classified as 
having high network opacity.  If, as I predict, the loan pricing discount is greater for borrowers 
with more opaque board networks, then the coefficient on the two-way interaction term, 
Connectedness Opacity_Net, is negative ( 3 0β < ). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
×
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CHAPTER 4: DATA AND SAMPLE 
 
I collect the data in this study from several sources.  I obtain board connections 
information from the Boardex database, which reports extensive information regarding the 
characteristics of board members and executives for US public firms from 2000 onwards.  The 
Boardex data include board size and composition along with each board member’s complete 
history of other board memberships and socio-demographics such as age, gender, education, and 
nationality.  Stock prices and accounting variables are from CRSP and Compustat.  Using the 
Dealscan database, I also collect information on bank loans made to US public firms, the 
majority of which are syndicated between multiple banks that share lending risk.  The unit of 
observation in Dealscan is a loan facility.  For each facility, Dealscan lists a number of borrower 
and lender characteristics including the interest rate, the identity of the borrower and participant 
banks, the stated purpose of the loan, information about covenants, loan amount, maturity, and 
presence or absence of collateral.  As mentioned earlier, a syndicated loan typically has multiple 
lenders who are classified broadly into two categories: lead arranger (or lead bank) and 
participant lenders.  The lead arranger is the key lender, who originates the loan with the 
borrower and is responsible for screening borrowers before loan syndication and for monitoring 
borrowers throughout the life of the loans.14  To test hypothesis 1, I focus on a borrowers’ choice 
                                                          
14 Following Sufi (2007), I use two variables to classify lenders as either lead arrangers or participants.  Both are 
available from Dealscan. One variable is “Lead arranger credit” and the other is “Lender role”.  I designate as lead 
arrangers any lender for which the field “lead arranger credit” is marked “Yes”.  If this field is unavailable, then 
lenders that act as an administrative agent, agent, arranger, bookrunner, lead arranger, lead bank, or lead manager 
are defined to be lead arrangers. 
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of lead arranger for each loan facility.  The sample for hypothesis 1 contains 15,974 loan 
facilities from 2,868 firms over the sample period of 2000–2015.15  For each of those loan 
facilities, I consider all possible matches with the top 100 banks during my sample period, 
generating a total of 1,597,400 possible matches.  I use this sample for hypothesis 1.  Table 1, 
Panel A, provides summary statistics for the potential loan-bank matches sample.  The mean 
value of Realized_Lender is 0.019, which indicates that the unconditional probability of being 
chosen as the lead arranger is 1.9%.  The mean value of Connected_Bank is 0.074, which 
suggests that 7.4% of the bank lenders have made a loan to the borrower’s connected firm 
before.  The mean value of Prior_lending_relationship is 0.031, which indicates that 3.1% of the 
bank lenders have an existing lending relationship with the borrower before the current loan.  
The average market share of the bank lenders, Market_Share, is 0.99% with standard deviation 
of 3.616%.  The average loan portfolio weight for a lender in the borrower’s industry, 
Industry_Specialization, is 2.5% with standard deviation of 9.5%.  The mean value of 
Same_Region is 0.014, which suggests that 1.4% of the firm-bank pair are located in the same 3-
digit Zip Code region. 
The sample for hypothesis 2 contains 11,934 loan facilities from 2,436 non-financial 
firms over the sample period of 2000–2015.  Table 1, Panel B, reports the summary statistics for 
this loan sample.  The mean Aggregate_Connectedness is 8.559, which implies that the average 
board in this sample has 8.559 aggregate connections, and the median and standard deviation are 
7 and 7.134 connections.  Untabulated statistics suggests that the Pearson correlation between 
Aggregate_Connectedness and the natural logarithm of assets is 0.551.  The Pearson correlation 
                                                          
15 I exclude financial firms, that is, firms with two-digit SIC between 60 and 64, inclusive (Ivashina, 2009).  In 
addition, my sample includes only loan deals that were successfully syndicated.  
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between Connectedness and the natural logarithm of assets is 0.084, which suggests that 
Connectedness effectively mitigates the size effect associated with Aggregate_Connectedness.  
The average return on asset, ROA, is 0.008 with standard deviation of 0.051.  The average 
proportion of tangible assets to total assets, Tangible, is 0.32.  The average leverage ratio, 
Leverage is 0.314.  The average log of total asset, Log_asset, is about 7.524, which is larger than 
average firms in Compustat.  The average firm age, Age, is about 24 years.  The average board in 
my sample has 9 directors (Board_Size).  The average loan spread, Log_spread, is 5.021 with 
standard deviation of 0.808.  The average natural logarithm of loan amount, LoanAmt is 19.153 
with standard deviation of 1.418.  Debt maturity, Maturity has a mean of 48.569 months.  The 
average number of financial covenants, NCOV is 1.543, and 47.3% of the loans are secured 
(Securedum).  Revolvers and institutional loans (term loan B or below) comprise 71.3% and 
10.5% of the sample (Revolver and TermLoanB).  48.1% of the loans have performance pricing 
provisions (Performance_Pricing).
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS 
 
5.1. The effect of prior lending relationship with a borrower’s connected firm on a bank’s 
likelihood of being chosen as the lead bank 
Table 2, Column 1, reports the regression summary statistics associated with estimation 
of Eq. (1). The key finding is that the Connected_Bank coefficient, 0.029, is significantly 
positive (t-statistic = 17.75).16  This finding indicates that having a lending relationship with a 
borrower’s connected firm increases a bank’s chances of granting a loan to that borrower.  In 
addition to being statistically significant, the effect is also economically significant.  The 
conditional probability of a potential lender without such a connection to the borrower being 
chosen as the lead bank, i.e., when Connected_Bank = 0, is 1.6% (evaluated at the mean of the 
independent variables), whereas this probability increases by 2.9% to 4.5% if the lender has such 
a connection to the borrower.  This suggests that having a relationship with a borrower’s 
connected firm more than doubles the probability of granting a loan to that borrower.  Because 
the dependent variable, Realized_Lender, is binary, I also estimate Eq. (1) using logistic 
regression.  Column 2 reports the odds ratio estimates from the logistic regression.  As in 
Column 1, Column 2 shows that the coefficient on Connected_Bank is positive and significant.  
The odds ratio for Connected_Bank is 3.74, which suggests that banks that have a lending 
relationship with a borrower’s connected firm are 3.7 times more likely to make a loan to that 
borrower relative to banks that do not have such connection.  Overall, these results confirm my 
                                                          
16 Throughout, when discussing a coefficient, I use the term significant to denote a 5% significance level under a 
two-sided alternative. 
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hypothesis about the importance of building a relationship with a borrower’s connected firm in 
the syndicated loan market.   
The Table 2 findings for the primary control variables are consistent with prior 
research(e.g., Bharath et al., 2007; Hellmann et al., 2008; Cai et al., 2016).  Having a prior 
lending relationship with the borrower itself  (Prior_lending_relationship) increases the 
probability of subsequently granting a loan to the same borrower.  Lenders with higher loan 
market share or reputation in the syndicated loan market (Market_Share) have higher 
probabilities of granting a loan.  Bank industry specialization (Industry_Specialization) increases 
a bank’s likelihood of making a loan to that specialized industry.  Banks that are located in the 
same region (Same_Region) as a borrower’s headquarter have higher probabilities of making a 
loan to that borrower.  
5.2. The effect of board connectedness on loan pricing 
Table 3, Column 1, reports the regression summary statistics associated with estimation 
of Eq. (2).  The key finding is that the Connectedness coefficient is significantly negative 
(coefficient = –0.104; t-statistic = –3.34).  The magnitude of the coefficient is also economically 
significant, implying that loan spreads decrease by approximately 10% when a firm’s board 
connectedness ranking moves from the bottom quintile to the top quintile.  This implies that for a 
firm that faces a loan spread of 200bp when its board connectedness is in the bottom quintile, 
which is the average loan spread in my sample, the loan spread decreases to180bp if the firm’s 
connectedness ranking moves to the top quintile.  Finding that there is a loan pricing discount for 
well-connected borrowers is consistent with banks valuing board connectedness because the 
borrowers can help the banks win loans from other firms in the borrower’s network. 
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The findings in Table 3 also reveal that the majority of the control variables’ coefficients 
are significant, with signs that are largely consistent with prior research (e.g., Zhang, 2008; 
Ivashina, 2009; Bushman et al., forthcoming).  For example, firms with high return on assets 
(ROA) and larger firms (Log_asset) on average have a lower cost of debt.  More highly leveraged 
firms (Leverage) pay higher spreads.  Regarding the non-price loan terms, the loan amount 
(LoanAmt) and loan maturity (Maturity) coefficients are statistically negative.  Both collateral 
(Securedum) and number of covenants (NCOV) are positively related to loan spread, which 
perhaps reflects the endogenous determination of loan contractual terms.  The significantly 
negative coefficient on Revolver and significantly positive coefficient on TermLoanB indicate 
that revolver loans and term loans B (i.e., those in which syndicate participants are non-bank 
institutions) face lower and higher rates.  The significantly negative coefficient on 
Performance_Pricing indicates that loans with performance pricing provisions have lower 
interest rates.  
Larcker et al., (2013) finds that companies with boards at a more central location in the 
board network tend to have better future performance.  Hence one potential alternative 
explanation for the loan pricing discount for well-connected borrowers is that bank lenders 
anticipate better future performance of well-connected firms and thus charge lower interest rates.  
To mitigate this concern, I re-estimate Eq. (2) and include ROA in the next 3 years as a control 
for future performance.  Table 3, Column 2, reports the regression summary statistics associated 
with this estimation.  As expected, coefficients on ROA in years t+1 and year t+2 are 
significantly negatively related to loan spread.  However, the Connectedness coefficient is 
significantly negative (coefficient = –0.107; t-statistic = –3.05).  In addition, the Connectedness 
coefficients and t-statistics are of similar magnitudes whether or not subsequent years ROA are 
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included as controls, which suggests that future growth has no impact on the relation between 
loan spread and connectedness.  Furthermore, my inference remains the same if I use stock 
return as an alternative measure for performance.  
Taken together, the findings in Table 3 indicate that borrowers with a well-connected 
board obtain loans at a lower spread.  These findings, together with the findings in Table 2, 
portray a consistent picture:  a borrower’s board connectedness creates a potential for its bank 
lender to sell loan to the borrower’s connected firms.  In return for this opportunity for future 
growth, the lender offers a well-connected borrower favorable loan contracts.  
5.3. The information intermediation role of common directors  
5.3.1. The effect of borrower opacity on a connected bank’s likelihood of winning a loan 
Table 4 reports summary statistics associated with estimation of Eq. (3).  The key finding 
is that the coefficient on the interaction term, Connected_Bank Opacity, is significantly 
positive (coefficient = 0.013; t-statistic = 2.37), which is consistent with the prediction that a 
connected bank’s likelihood of winning loan business from a new borrower is higher if the 
borrower is more opaque.  The Connected_Bank coefficient is also significantly positive 
(coefficient = 0.023; t-statistic = 6.94), suggesting that a connected bank’s probability of 
granting a loan to a borrower will increase by 2.3% even if the borrower is informationally 
transparent.  If the borrower is opaque then this probability will increase by 3.6% (= 0.023 + 
0.013).  Overall, this finding supports the view that a bank that has a prior lending relationship 
with a borrower’s connected firm gains privileged information about that borrower and thus has 
an informational advantage over de novo bank lenders when competing for loan business. 
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5.3.2. The effect of board network informational opacity on loan pricing 
Table 5 reports regression summary statistics associated with estimation of Eq. (4).  The 
key finding is that the coefficient on the interaction term, Connectedness Opacity_Net, is 
significantly negative (coefficient = –0.124; t-statistic = –2.12), which is consistent with the 
prediction that a well-connected borrower that has more opaque firms in its board network 
receives more loan pricing discount from the bank lender.  The Connectedness coefficient is also 
significantly negative (coefficient = – 0.091; t-statistic = –2.66), suggesting that a well-connected 
borrower still receives a loan pricing discount even if firms in the borrower’s network have 
transparent information.  However, if firms in the borrower’s network are opaque, then the loan 
pricing discount increases to 0.215  (= 0.091 + 0.124).  Overall, this finding supports the view 
that banks perceive the cross-firm selling potential to a borrower’s connected firms is higher if 
the connected firms are more opaque and thus are willing to offer more loan pricing discount.  
This finding extends the extant accounting literature relating the quality of accounting 
information to debt contracting (e.g., Armstrong, Guay and Weber, 2010; Dechow, Ge and 
Schrand, 2010).  Although much of this literature suggests that the quality of a firm’s financial 
reporting positively affects its debt contracting outcomes, this paper demonstrates that the debt 
contracting outcomes of a borrower also depend on the financial reporting quality of its 
connected firms and that the borrower can benefit from the opacity of its connected firms. 
5.4. Robustness: bank heterogeneity  
The findings in Table 2 indicate that having made a loan to a potential borrower’s 
connected firm, Connected_Bank, increases a bank’s likelihood of winning loan business from 
that borrower.  To mitigate the effects of endogeneity, it is important that Connected_Bank does 
not simply reflect other bank lender attributes that could affect the bank’s likelihood of winning 
×
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loan business from a borrower.  To further mitigate the effects of lender attribute heterogeneity, I 
re-estimate  Eq. (1) by including bank fixed effects in the regression.  Untabulated findings 
reveal that the Connected_Bank coefficient is significantly positive (coefficient = 0.024; t-
statistic = 15.41).  The t-statistics and coefficient are of similar magnitudes whether or not bank 
fixed effects are included as controls, which indicates that other omitted bank characteristics 
have minimal impact on the relation between the probability of being selected as a lender and 
being a connected bank, Connected_Bank. 
For Eq. (2), the majority of the control variables are defined at the firm level and not at 
the lender level.  When capital providers are relatively homogeneous, lender specific attributes 
are unikely to influence lending outcomes (e.g., loan pricing).  However, in the syndicated loan 
market, the ability to screen and monitor borrowers could differ significantly between banks.  To 
that extent that such differences are correlated with my board connectedness measure, 
Connectedness, the coefficient I report would be biased.  To further mitigate the effects of lender 
attribute heterogeneity, I re-estimate  Eq. (2) by including bank fixed effects in the regression.  
Untabulated findings reveal that the Connectedness coefficient is significantly positive 
(coefficient = 0.101; t-statistic = –3.24).  The t-statistics and coefficient essentially remain 
unchanged whether or not bank fixed effects are included as controls, which suggests that other 
omitted bank characteristics have no effect on the relation between loan spread and board 
connectedness. 
5.5. Endogeneity  
 The findings in Table 2 indicate that a bank’s chance of winning loan business from a borrower 
increases if the bank previously made loans to the borrower’s connected firm.  An explanation 
for this finding is that common directors, who sit on the borrower’s board and the connected 
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firm’s board with which the bank has an existing lending relationship, act as informal financial 
intermediaries between the bank and the borrower and help the bank to win the loan business 
from the borrower.  However, two broad sources of endogeneity challenges the credibility of this 
effect: reverse causality, as a bank lender may recommend directors to sit on their borrower’s 
board, and (2) director-firm matching on an ommited attribute that determines both board 
composition and lender choice.  
5.5.1. Reverse causality 
The first endogeneity concern is reverse causality.  That is, during the loan negotiation 
process and before the final loan origination date, a bank lender is selected by the new borrower, 
and then the lender recommends a director with which the lender has developed a relationship in 
the past to sit on the borrower’s board.  One approach to address this possibility is to consider the 
role of the individual director’s tenure on the new borrower.  If the director has served on the 
new borrower’s board for a relatively long period of time before the loan origination, for 
instance, 2 or more years, then it is unlikely that the findings in Table 2 are attributable to reverse 
causality.  Hence, I re-estimate Eq. (1) by using observations that exclude loans where the 
common directors have served on the borrower’s board for less than 2 years before loan 
origination.  Table 6, Panel A, reports the regression summary statistics associated with 
estimation of Eq. (1) using the new sample.  The key finding in Column (1) is that the 
Connected_Bank coefficient, 0.030, is significantly positive (t-statistic = 14.58).  Column 2 
reports the odds ratio estimates from the logistic regression.  As in Column 1, Column 2 shows 
that the coefficient on Connected_Bank is positive and significant (coefficient = 2.435, t-statistic 
= 19.70).  Taken together, these findings provide additional support that the inferences I draw 
from Tables 2 and 3 findings are not the result of reverse causality.  
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5.5.2. Director-firm matching  
Directors and firms are not matched randomly.17  The fact that a director sits on two 
firms’ board could just indicate a similarity between the two firms, and this commonality may 
cause each firm to select the same bank lenders.  This is effectively a correlated omitted variable 
problem, in which a potentially omitted factor is anything that both determines director matching 
to firms and is correlated with a firm’s propensity to select certain bank lenders.  To address this 
problem, in above sections, I explicitly include controls for time-variant firm heterogeneity 
through loan fixed effects, time-invariant bank heterogeneity through bank fixed effects and 
time-varying bank characteristics through observable control variables (e.g., market power) in 
my lender-choice model Eq. (1).  However, even after including these controls, an omitted 
variable can still operate at the firm and bank pair level, e.g., because the firm and bank operate 
in the same geographic region.   
To mitigate this concern, I use two approaches.  First, as discussed in section 3, I 
explicitly include controls for relevant firm-bank level variables in the lender choice model Eq. 
(1).  I consider two dimensions: industry- and geography-proximity effects, because these are 
dimensions along which bank lending activities can cluster and board service is determined.  
With respect to industry effects, prior research suggests that different banks may specialize in 
different industries (e.g., Cai et al., 2016).  Moreover, links in the director network could reflect 
patterns of demand for directors with industry-specific expertise that enhances the value of their 
advice.  To mitigate this concern, I include in Eq. (1) a bank specialization variable measured at 
the firm-bank level, Industry_Specialization, which reflects a bank’s degree of specialization in 
                                                          
17 Several authors have modeled board composition as a response to firms’ relative needs for monitoring versus 
advising (e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Harris and Raviv, 2008), and empirical 
studies have also found associations between board composition and firm characteristics (e.g., Boone, Field, 
Karpoff, and Raheja, 2007; Linck, Netter, and Yang, 2008; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2008).   
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the borrower’s industry.  With respect to geography proximity effects, the concern is that if 
banks close to their borrowers have information or monitoring advantages over other competing 
banks and directors serve on geographically proximate firms, then the documented findings 
simply reflect the local information networks in the private debt lending market (e.g., Brickley, 
Linck, and Smith, 2003).  To address this issue, I include in Eq. (1) an indictor variable for 
whether the bank and the borrower are located in the same 3-digit Zip code region as a control 
for a firm’s proximity to the bank lender. 
My second approach to mitigate the effect of omitted correlated variable that operates at 
the firm-bank level is to include firm-bank fixed effects (i.e., firm-bank pair) in the lender-choice 
model Eq. (1).  Because many firms borrow multiple times over the fifteen-year sample period 
and a bank’s connection to a firm can change over time, I can estimate Eq. (1) with firm-bank 
fixed effects.18  Table 6, Panel B, reports the regression summary statistics associated with 
estimation of Eq. (1) using the new fixed effects structure.  The key finding in Column (1) is that 
the Connected_Bank coefficient, 0.014, is significantly positive (t-statistic = 7.12).  As in 
Column 1, Column 2 shows that the coefficient on Connected_Bank is positive and significant 
(coefficient = 1.432, t-statistic = 5.77).  These findings provide additional support that the 
inferences I draw from Tables 2 and 3 findings are not the result of director-firm matching. 
5.6. Loan pricing for firms in a well-connected borrower’s board network  
The findings in Table 2 indicate that a bank’s chance of winning a loan from a new 
borrower increases if the bank previously made loans to the borrower’s connected firm.  In this 
section, I investigate whether the bank offers favorable loan contract terms to the new borrower 
                                                          
18 To allow for firm-bank fixed effects in the model, loan fixed effects (i.e., firm-year fixed effects) need to be 
excluded, and year fixed effects are added to the model.  In addition, firms that borrowed only once during the 
sample period will not be used to identify the coefficient of interest because the effects of these observations are 
subsumed by the firm-bank fixed effects. 
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as reflected in lower interest spreads.  On the one hand, the common directors allow the 
connected bank to gain inside information about the borrower, which reduces information 
asymmetries between the borrower and the connected bank.  This reduced information 
asymmetry implies that the borrower can obtain loans at a lower interest spread (Diamond 1984; 
Bharath et al., 2011).  On the other hand, theory suggests that banks’ private information lets 
them hold up borrowers for higher interest rates.  As formulated by Rajan (1992) and Hauswald 
and Marquez (2006), the information advantage of inside banks decreases the aggressiveness of 
outside lenders in bidding for a loan, which increases the rents that inside lenders can extract 
from borrowers and thus results in higher interest rate spreads.  Prior studies such as Hale and 
Santo (2009) provides evidence consistent with the theoretical predication: banks price their 
information monopoly.  Hence, because of the two competing forces, whether a connected bank 
offers favorable loan contract terms to a new borrower is an empirical question. 
To analyze this question, I re-estimate Eq. (2) by including an indicator variable 
Connected_lending that equals one if the lead bank of a loan has made a loan to the borrower’s 
connected firm before, and zero otherwise.  Table 7 reports the regression summary statistics 
associated with estimation of the modified version of Eq. (2).  In Column 1, the 
Connected_lending coefficient is significantly negative (coefficient = –0.053; t-statistic = –2.68), 
which indicates that a borrower can obtain loans at a lower interest rate from a connected bank 
because of lower information asymmetry.  However, after including lender fixed effects to 
control for lender attributes heterogeneity, the Connected_lending coefficient ceases to be 
significant (coefficient = –0.025; t-statistic = –1.32).  Therefore, I do not find reliable evidence 
that connected banks offer favorable loan contracts to their new borrowers because of lower 
information asymmetry.  However, the Connectedness coefficient is positive and significant in 
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both columns, indicating that banks value their borrowers’ board connectedness.  Taken together, 
these findings suggest that banks do not offer lower loan spreads to firms in their existing 
borrower’s board network because of lower information asymmetry but do compensate well-
connected borrowers for access to the cross-firm selling opportunities provided by their 
networks.
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CHAPTER 6: SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Whereas recent studies suggest that board networks can function as a means for 
information transmission and play an important role in the financial markets, there is little 
research examining whether information flows through board networks can affect relative 
information asymmetries across potential lenders and thereby influence competition among bank 
lenders in the private lending market.  This paper provides evidence that a bank can exploit its 
existing borrower’s board network to gain an informational advantage relative to other potential 
lenders when competing for loan business from firms in the borrower’s board network.  This 
informational advantage, which arises from there being a common director in the existing 
borrower’s board and firms in the borrower’s board network, enhances the likelihood of winning 
new loan business from these connected firms.  Specifically, I find that having made a previous 
loan to a borrower’s connected firm more than doubles a bank’s likelihood of granting a loan to 
that new borrower.  In addition, I find that banks are willing to compensate well-connected 
borrowers by offering lower loan spreads because these borrowers provide greater cross-firm 
selling opportunities. 
Moreover, consistent with board networks providing connected banks with an 
informational advantage over de novo lenders, I also find that the probability of a connected bank 
winning loan business from a new borrower is higher if the borrower is more informationally 
opaque.  Moreover, as further evidence of a network-based information advantage, I find that the 
loan spread discount for an existing well-connected borrower is greater if firms in that  
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borrower’s board network are more opaque.  The explanation is that well-connected borrowers 
with more opaque firms in their board networks have higher cross-firm selling potential, and thus 
bank lenders are willing to offer more favorable contract terms to them.  Hence, this paper 
contrasts prior studies by considering the possibility that the opacity of a well-connected 
borrowers’ network can be valuable to a bank and that the borrower can benefit from the opacity 
of its connected firms via lower loan spreads. 
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TABLE 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
    This table presents summary statistics for the sample of syndicated loans used in this study. The data 
period is from 2000–2015. The unit of analysis is a loan-bank pair in Panel A and loan facility in Panel B. 
Realized_Lender is an indicator variable that equals one if a bank is the lead arranger of the loan, and zero 
otherwise. Connected_Bank is an indicator variable that equals one if a potential bank lender has 
previously originated a loan to the borrower’s connected firm, and zero otherwise. I define two 
firms/boards as connected/linked if they share at least one board member. Prior_lending_relationship is 
an indicator variable that equals one if a bank has originated loans to the borrower prior to the current 
loan, and zero otherwise. Market_Share is the market share of a bank as a lead arranger in the US 
syndicated loan market. Industry_Specialization is loan portfolio weight for a bank in the borrower’s 
industry. Same_Region is an indicator that equals one if the headquarters of the borrower and the bank in 
a loan-bank pair are located in the same region (i.e., same 3-digit ZIP code), and zero otherwise. 
Aggregate_Connectedness is a firm's total number of links to outside boards (firms). Connectedness is 
transformed quantile rank of Aggregate_Connectedness with a range from 0 to 1 (orthogonal to firm size 
as well). ROA is return on assets, defined as operating income after depreciation, divided by total assets. 
Leverage is total debt divided by total assets. Tangible is defined as property, plant and equipment (PPE), 
divided by total assets. Log_asset is the natural logarithm of a firm’s total asset. Opacity is a credit 
market-based financial reporting opacity measure for a borrower. Board_Size is the number of directors 
on a firm's board. Age is firm age in years. Opacity_Net is a credit market-based financial reporting 
opacity measure for all firms in a borrower’s board network. Log_spread is the natural logarithm of 
interest spread of a loan measured in basis points. LoanAmt is the natural logarithm of loan dollar amount 
in millions. Maturity is loan term in months. NCOV is the number of financial and net worth covenants 
for a loan deal. Securedum is an indicator variable that equals one if the debt is secured and zero 
otherwise. TermLoanB is an indicator variable that equals one if the loan is term loan B, C, or D, and zero 
otherwise. Revolver is an indicator variable that equals one if the loan is a revolver, and zero otherwise. 
Performance_Pricing is an indicator variable equal to one when borrower has a guarantor, and zero 
otherwise. 
Panel A: loan-bank pairs              
Variable N Mean Std Dev P25 Median P75 
Realized_Lender 1,597,400 0.019 0.137 0 0 0 
Connected_Bank 1,597,400 0.074 0.262 0 0 0 
Prior_lending_relationship 1,597,400 0.031 0.173 0 0 0 
Market_Share(%)  1,597,400 0.994 3.616 0.001 0.041 0.329 
Industry_Specialization  1,597,400 0.025 0.095 0 0 0.004 
Same_Region  1,597,400 0.014 0.116 0 0 0 
Opacity 1,496,500 –0.487 0.123 –0.550 –0.461 –0.411 
 
Panel B: syndicated loans             
Variable N Mean Std Dev P25 Median P75 
Connectedness 11,934 0.487 0.360 0.250 0.500 0.750 
Aggregate_Connectedness 11,934 8.559 7.134 3.000 7.000 12.000 
ROA 11,934 0.008 0.051 0.001 0.010 0.019 
Tangible  11,934 0.320 0.252 0.112 0.246 0.491 
Leverage 11,934 0.314 0.218 0.169 0.292 0.418 
Log_asset 11,934 7.524 1.612 6.429 7.486 8.583 
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Table 1 (continued)       
Age 11,934 24.359 17.449 10.000 18.000 39.000 
Board_Size 11,934 9.000 2.428 7.000 9.000 10.000 
Opacity_Net 11,166 –0.486 0.073 –0.531 –0.480 –0.437 
Log_spread 11,934 5.021 0.808 4.605 5.165 5.541 
LoanAmt 11,934 19.153 1.418 18.421 19.254 20.055 
Maturity 11,934 48.569 20.886 36 60 60 
NCOV 11,934 1.543 1.414 0 2 3 
Securdum 11,934 0.473 0.499 0 0 1 
Revolver 11,934 0.713 0.452 0 1 1 
TermLoanB 11,934 0.105 0.307 0 0 0 
Performance_pricing 11,934 0.481 0.500 0 0 1 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2: THE EFFECT OF PRIOR LENDING RELATIONSHIP WITH A BORROWER’S CONNECTED FIRM ON A BANK’S 
LIKELIHOOD OF BEING CHOSEN AS THE LEAD ARRANGER 
 
    This table reports coefficient estimates from regressions relating the likelihood of a potential lender being chosen as the lead arranger by the 
borrower to whether the potential lender has originated loans to the borrower’s connected firm before. Each observation corresponds to one loan-
bank pair (i.e., each loan is matched to 100 potential bank lenders, who are among the top 100 lead arrangers in the sample). The dependent 
variable, Realized_Lender is an indicator variable that equals one if the potential bank lender is the lead arranger of the loan, and zero otherwise. 
Connected_Bank is an indicator variable that equals one if the potential bank lender has previously originated a loan to the borrower’s connected 
firm, and zero otherwise. I define two firms/boards as connected/linked if they share at least one board member. Prior_lending_relationship is an 
indicator variable that equals one if the potential bank lender has originated loans to the borrower prior to the current loan, and zero otherwise. 
Market_Share is the market share of the potential bank as lead arranger in the US syndicated loan market. Industry_Specialization is loan portfolio 
weight for the potential bank lender in the borrower’s industry. Same_Region is an indicator that equals one if the headquarters of the borrower 
and the potential bank lender are located in the same region, and zero otherwise. All regressions include loan facility fixed effects, which are used 
to rule out any facility-specific effects, including the effects from the borrower, the lead arranger, the time trend in a particular year, and any loan 
characteristics. t-statistics based on robust standard errors allowing for clustering by borrower are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
  Dependent variable: Realized_Lender 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 OLS Logit OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
  Odds ratio      
Connected_Bank 0.029*** 3.740*** 0.143*** 0.062*** 0.060*** 0.142*** 0.142*** 
  (17.75) (30.26) (60.83) (38.18) (26.39) (60.58) (60.78) 
Prior_lending_relationship 0.351*** 47.505***  0.395***    
 (52.76) (98.44)  (62.65)    
Market_Share 0.638*** 1,389.190***   1.251***   
 (30.93) (31.45)   (54.11)   
Industry_Specilization 0.012*** 6.757***    0.034***  
 (7.27) (25.78)    (15.74)  
Same_Region 0.008*** 1.549***     0.025*** 
 (2.92) (3.23)     (5.98) 
Loan FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1,597,400 1,597,400 1,597,400 1,597,400 1,597,400 1,597,400 1,597,400 
Adjusted (Pseudo) R-squared 0.318 0.531 0.074 0.297 0.161 0.075 0.074 
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TABLE 3: THE EFFECT OF BOARD CONNECTEDNESS ON LOAN SPREAD 
 
    This table reports the results of OLS regressions investigating the effect of board connectedness on 
loan spread. Each observation in the analysis corresponds to one loan facility. The dependent variable, 
Log_spread, is the natural logarithm of loan spread (in basis points). Aggregate_Connectedness is a firm's 
total number of links to outside boards (firms).  Connectedness is transformed quintile rank of 
Aggregate_Connectedness with a range from 0 to 1 (orthogonal to firm size as well). ROA is return on 
assets, defined as operating income after depreciation, divided by total assets. Leverage is total debt 
divided by total assets. Tangible is defined as property, plant and equipment (PPE), divided by total 
assets. Log_asset is the natural logarithm of a firm’s total asset. Board_Size is the number of directors on 
a firm's board. Age is firm age in years. LoanAmt is the natural logarithm of loan dollar amount in 
millions. Maturity is loan term in months. NCOV is the number of financial and net worth covenants for a 
loan deal. Securedum is an indicator variable that equals one if the debt is secured and zero otherwise. 
TermLoanB is an indicator variable that equals one if the loan is term loan B, C, or D, and zero otherwise. 
Revolver is an indicator variable that equals one if the loan is a revolver, and zero otherwise. 
Performance_Pricing is an indicator variable equal to one when borrower has a guarantor, and zero 
otherwise. t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by borrower. *, ** and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
  (1)   (2) 
Variables Log_spread  Log_spread 
        
Connectedness –0.104***   –0.107*** 
  (–3.34)   (–3.05) 
    
Firm characteristics    
ROA –1.141***  –0.433 
 (–4.08)  (–1.18) 
Tangible  –0.082  –0.093 
 (–0.58)  (–0.58) 
Leverage 0.555***  0.556*** 
 (7.46)  (6.39) 
Log_asset –0.064***  –0.081*** 
 (–2.71)  (–3.03) 
Age –0.017  –0.021 
 (–0.72)  (–0.76) 
Board_Size 0.007  0.007 
 (1.09)  (1.08) 
Loan characteristics    
LoanAmt –0.050***  –0.050*** 
 (–6.42)  (–5.42) 
Maturity –0.001**  –0.001** 
 (–2.09)  (–2.54) 
NCOV 0.022***  0.025*** 
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Table 3 (continued)    
 (3.30)  (3.36) 
Securdum 0.085***  0.075*** 
 (4.22)  (3.30) 
Revolver –0.137***  –0.136*** 
 (–10.33)  (–9.14) 
TermLoanB 0.131***  0.107*** 
 (6.40)  (4.79) 
Performance_Pricing –0.057***  –0.047*** 
 (–3.91)  (–2.86) 
Future performance    
ROA (t+1)   –0.315*** 
   (–2.74) 
ROA (t+2)   –0.260*** 
   (–2.87) 
ROA (t+3)   –0.100 
   (–1.28) 
Credit Rating FE YES  YES 
Loan Purpose FE YES  YES 
Firm FE YES  YES 
Year FE YES  YES 
Observations 11,934  9,794 
Adjusted R–squared 0.811   0.825 
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TABLE 4:THE EFFECT OF PRIOR LENDING RELATIONSHIP WITH A BORROWER’S 
CONNECTED FIRM ON A BANK’S LIKELIHOOD OF BEING CHOSEN AS THE LEAD 
ARRANGER, DOES THE BORROWER’S FINANCIAL REPORTING OPACITY MATTER 
 
This table reports coefficient estimates from regressions relating the likelihood of a potential lender 
being chosen as the lead arranger by the borrower to whether the potential lender has originated loans to 
the borrower’s connected firm before. Each observation corresponds to one loan-bank pair (each loan 
facility is matched to 100 potential lenders, who are among the top 100 lead arrangers in the sample). The 
dependent variable, Realized_Lender is an indicator variable that equals one if the potential bank lender is 
the lead arranger of the loan, and zero otherwise. Connected_Bank is an indicator variable that equals one 
if the potential bank lender has previously originated a loan to the borrower’s connected firm, and zero 
otherwise. I define two firms/boards as connected/linked if they share at least one board member. Opacity 
is a transformed decile rank of a credit market-based financial reporting opacity measure for a borrower 
and ranges from 0 to 1. Prior_lending_relationship is an indicator variable that equals one if the potential 
bank lender has originated loans to the borrower prior to the current loan, and zero otherwise. 
Market_Share is the market share of the potential bank lender as lead arranger in the US syndicated loan 
market. Industry_Specialization is loan portfolio weight for the potential bank lender in the borrower’s 
industry. Same_Region is an indicator that equals one if the headquarters of the borrower and the potential 
bank lender are located in the same region, and zero otherwise. All regressions include loan facility fixed 
effects, which are used to rule out any facility-specific effects, including the effects from the borrower, 
the lead arranger, the time trend in a particular year, and any loan characteristics. t-statistics based on 
robust standard errors allowing for clustering by borrower are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
    (1)   
Variables   Realized_Lender   
    
Connected_Bank  0.023***  
  (6.94)  
Connected_Bank × Opacity  0.013**  
  (2.37)  
Prior_lending_relationship  0.353***  
  (50.94)  
Market_Share  0.633***  
  (29.83)  
Industry_Specialization  0.012***  
  (7.08)  
Same_Region  0.009***  
  (2.91)  
    
Loan FE  YES  
Observations  1,496,500  
Adjusted R-squared   0.319   
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TABLE 5: THE EFFECT OF BORROWER’S BOARD CONNECTEDNESS ON LOAN SPREAD, 
DOES INFORMATIONAL OPACITY OF FIRMS IN THE BORROWER’S BOARD NETWORK 
MATTER 
 
    This table reports the results of OLS regressions investigating the effect of board connectedness on 
loan spread. Each observation in the analysis corresponds to one loan facility. The dependent variable, 
Log_spread, is the natural logarithm of loan spread (in basis points). Aggregate_Connectedness is a firm's 
total number of links to outside boards (firms).  Connectedness is transformed quintile rank of 
Aggregate_Connectedness with a range from 0 to 1 (orthogonal to firm size as well). Opacity_Net is an 
indicator variable that equals one if firms in the borrower’s network are on average opaque (see appendix 
for detail), and zero otherwise. ROA is return on assets, defined as operating income after depreciation, 
divided by total assets. Leverage is total debt divided by total assets. Tangible is defined as property, 
plant and equipment (PPE), divided by total assets. Log_asset is the natural logarithm of a firm’s total 
asset. Board_Size is the number of directors on a firm's board. Age is firm age in years. LoanAmt is the 
natural logarithm of loan dollar amount in millions. Maturity is loan term in months. NCOV is the number 
of financial and net worth covenants for a loan deal. Securedum is an indicator variable that equals one if 
the debt is secured and zero otherwise. TermLoanB is an indicator variable that equals one if the loan is 
term loan B, C, or D, and zero otherwise. Revolver is an indicator variable that equals one if the loan is a 
revolver, and zero otherwise. Performance_Pricing is an indicator variable equal to one when borrower 
has a guarantor, and zero otherwise. t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by 
borrower. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
    (1)   
Variables  Log_spread  
        
Connectedness  –0.091***  
  (–2.66)  
Opacity_Net   0.068**  
  (2.19)  
Connectedness × Opacity_Net   –0.124**  
  (–2.12)  
ROA  –1.098***  
  (–3.77)  
Tangible  –0.066  
  (–0.44)  
Leverage  0.546***  
  (6.91)  
Log_asset  –0.059**  
  (–2.36)  
Age  –0.010  
  (–0.41)  
Board_Size  0.005  
  (0.84)  
LoanAmt  –0.050***  
  (–6.16)  
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Table 5 (continued)    
Maturity  –0.001**  
  (–1.97)  
NCOV  0.024***  
  (3.39)  
Securdum  0.090***  
  (4.19)  
Revolver  –0.132***  
  (–9.52)  
TermLoanB  0.131***  
  (6.20)  
Performance_Pricing  –0.059***  
  (–3.95)  
    
Credit Rating FE  YES  
Loan Purpose FE  YES  
Firm FE  YES  
Year FE  YES  
Observations  11,166  
Adjusted R-squared   0.815   
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TABLE 6: THE EFFECT OF PRIOR LENDING RELATIONSHIP WITH A BORROWER’S 
CONNECTED FIRM ON A BANK’S LIKELIHOOD OF BEING CHOSEN AS THE LEAD 
ARRANGER, TENURED DIRECTORS AND BORROWER-BANK FIXED EFFECTS 
 
    This table reports coefficient estimates from regressions relating the likelihood of a potential lender 
being chosen as the lead arranger by the borrower to whether the potential lender has originated loans to 
the borrower’s connected firm before. In Panel A, I exclude loans where common directors have served 
on the borrower’s board for less than 2 years before loan origination. Common directors are those who sit 
on the borrower’s board and the connected firm’s board with which a bank has an existing lending 
relationship. In Panel B, I include borrower-bank fixed effects in Eq. (1).  Each observation corresponds 
to one loan (firm)-bank pair (each loan facility is matched to 100 potential lenders, who are among the top 
100 lead arrangers in the sample). The dependent variable, Realized_Lender is an indicator that equals 
one if the potential bank lender is the lead arranger of the loan, and zero otherwise. Connected_Bank is an 
indicator variable that equals one if the potential bank lender has previously originated a loan to the 
borrower’s connected firm, and zero otherwise. I define two firms/boards as connected/linked if they 
share at least one board member. Prior_lending_relationship is an indicator variable that equals one if the 
potential bank lender has originated loans to the borrower prior to the current loan, and zero otherwise. 
Market_Share is the market share of the potential bank as lead arranger in the US syndicated loan market. 
Industry_Specialization is loan portfolio weight for the potential bank lender in the borrower’s industry. 
Same_Region is an indicator that equals one if the headquarters of the borrower and the potential bank 
lender are located in the same region, and zero otherwise. All regressions include loan facility fixed 
effects, which are used to rule out any facility-specific effects, including the effects from the borrower, 
the lead arranger, the time trend in a particular year, and any loan characteristics. t-statistics based on 
robust standard errors allowing for clustering by borrower are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Panel A: tenured director sample  
 Dependent variable: Realized_Lender 
  (1)   (2) 
 OLS  Logit 
   Coefficient    Odds ratio 
Connected_Bank 0.030***   2.435*** 
  (14.58)   (19.70) 
Prior_lending_relationship 0.351***  52.952*** 
 (52.32)  (103.55) 
Market_Share 0.666***  5,361.845*** 
 (32.29)  (35.49) 
Industry_Specilization 0.012***  6.348*** 
 (7.65)  (25.13) 
Same_Region 0.008***  1.627*** 
 (2.95)  (3.54) 
    
Loan FE YES  YES 
Observations 1,565,000  1,565,000 
Adjusted (Pseudo) R-squared 0.317  0.523 
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Table 6 (continued) 
Panel B: borrower-bank fixed effects  
 Dependent variable: Realized_Lender 
  (1)   (2) 
 OLS  Logit 
  Coefficient    Odds ratio 
Connected_Bank 0.014***  1.432*** 
  (7.12)  (5.77) 
Prior_lending_relationship 0.156***  0.564*** 
 (13.01)  (-8.51) 
Market_Share –0.227***  914.663*** 
 (–2.99)  (7.58) 
Industry_Specilization 0.005***  11.583*** 
 (3.87)  (6.78) 
    
Borrower-Bank FE YES  YES 
Year FE YES  YES 
Observations 1,597,400  1,597,400 
Adjusted (Pseudo) R-squared 0.593  0.623 
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TABLE 7: THE EFFECT OF CONNECTED LENDING ON LOAN SPREAD 
 
    This table reports the results of OLS regressions investigating whether a borrower pays lower loan 
spreads if the bank lender has made a loan to the borrower’s connected firm before. Each observation in 
the analysis corresponds to one loan facility. The dependent variable, Log_spread, is the natural logarithm 
of loan spread (in basis points). Connected_lending is an indicator variable that equals one if the lead 
bank of a loan has made a loan to the borrower’s connected firm before, and zero otherwise. 
Connectedness is transformed quintile rank of Aggregate_Connectedness with a range from 0 to 1 
(orthogonal to firm size as well). ROA is return on assets, defined as operating income after depreciation, 
divided by total assets. Leverage is total debt divided by total assets. Tangible is defined as property, 
plant and equipment (PPE), divided by total assets. Log_asset is the natural logarithm of a firm’s total 
asset. Board_Size is the number of directors on a firm's board. Age is firm age in years. LoanAmt is the 
natural logarithm of loan dollar amount in millions. Maturity is loan term in months. NCOV is the number 
of financial and net worth covenants for a loan deal. Securedum is an indicator variable that equals one if 
the debt is secured and zero otherwise. TermLoanB is an indicator variable that equals one if the loan is 
term loan B, C, or D, and zero otherwise. Revolver is an indicator variable that equals one if the loan is a 
revolver, and zero otherwise. Performance_Pricing is an indicator variable equal to one when borrower 
has a guarantor, and zero otherwise. t–statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by 
borrower. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
  (1)   (2) 
Variables Log_spread  Log_spread 
        
Connected_lending –0.053***  –0.025 
  (–2.68)  (–1.32) 
Connectedness –0.097***  –0.097*** 
 (–3.12)  (–3.14) 
    
Firm characteristics    
ROA –1.112***  –1.105*** 
 (–3.99)  (–4.23) 
Tangible  –0.080  –0.061 
 (–0.57)  (–0.44) 
Leverage 0.561***  0.536*** 
 (7.56)  (7.13) 
Log_asset –0.061***  –0.052** 
 (–2.61)  (–2.25) 
Age –0.018  –0.023 
 (–0.75)  (–1.02) 
Board_Size 0.007  0.006 
 (1.21)  (1.00) 
Loan characteristics    
LoanAmt –0.049***  –0.047*** 
 (–6.24)  (–5.99) 
Maturity –0.001**  –0.001** 
 (–2.06)  (–2.00) 
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Table 7 (continued)    
NCOV 0.022***  0.021*** 
 (3.31)  (3.12) 
Securdum 0.084***  0.076*** 
 (4.16)  (3.82) 
Revolver –0.136***  –0.124*** 
 (–10.26)  (–9.60) 
TermLoanB 0.130***  0.119*** 
 (6.35)  (5.94) 
Performance_Pricing –0.056***  –0.056*** 
 (–3.85)  (–3.85) 
Credit Rating FE YES  YES 
Loan Purpose FE YES  YES 
Firm FE YES  YES 
Year FE YES  YES 
Bank FE NO  YES 
Observations 11,934  11,934 
Adjusted R–squared 0.812   0.818 
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APPENDIX: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
 
Variables Description 
Lender characteristics  
Realized_Lender An indicator variable that equals one if a bank is the lead 
arranger of the loan, and zero otherwise. 
Connected_Bank An indicator variable that equals one if a bank has previously 
originated a loan to the borrower’s connected firm, and zero 
otherwise. I define two firms/boards as connected/linked if 
they share at least one board member. 
Prior_lending_relationship An indicator variable that equals one if a bank has originated 
loans to the borrower prior to the current loan, and zero 
otherwise. 
Market_Share  Market share of a bank as a lead arranger in the US 
syndicated loan market during the past twelve months. 
Industry_Specialization  Loan portfolio weights for a bank in each industry 
specialization category (i.e., 2-digit SIC).  It is included as a 
proxy for a bank's specialization in the borrower’s industry. 
Same_Region  An indicator variable that equals one if the headquarters of a 
borrower and a bank are located in the same region (i.e., the 
same 3-digit ZIP code), and zero otherwise.  I use this 
variable as a proxy for the geographic proximity between the 
bank and the borrower. 
Loan Characteristics 
Log_spread  The natural logarithm of loan spread, which equals the 
spread between the interest rate on the loan and the relevant 
Libor rate, per dollar of loan, measured in basis points.  
LoanAmt  The natural logarithm of loan dollar amount in millions. 
Maturity The term of the loan in months.  
NCOV  The number of financial and net worth covenants reported on 
Dealscan. If no data are available we assume the number of 
covenants in the contracts is zero. The variables are 
measured per facility. 
Securedum An indicator variable equal to one if the debt is collateralized 
and zero otherwise, if missing collateral data, I treat it as 0. 
TermLoanB An indicator variable equal to one if the loan is term loan B, 
C D, and zero otherwise. 
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Revolver An indicator variable equal to one if the loan is a revolver, 
and zero otherwise.   
Performance_Pricing An indicator variable equal to one when borrower has a 
guarantor, and zero otherwise. 
Firm characteristics  
Aggregate_Connectedness A firm's total number of links to outside boards (firms).  I 
define two firms/boards as connected/linked if they share at 
least one board member. 
Connectedness A quintile ranked version of Aggregate_Connectedness that 
reduces the association with firm size. Specifically, for each 
year, all firms are ranked into quintiles based on total assets.  
Within each total asset quintile, firms are sorted into quintiles 
based on the connectedness measure, where the highest 
(lowest) value of connectedness assume a value of four 
(zero).  I further deflate this connectedness measure by four, 
so that range of this variable is between 0 and 1.  
Connected_lending An indicator variable that equals one if the lead bank of a 
loan has made a loan to the borrower’s connected firm 
before, and zero otherwise. 
ROA Return on assets. It is defined as operating income after 
depreciation divided by beginning of period total assets.  
Leverage Total debt (short-term debt plus long-term debt) divided by 
total assets. 
Tangible Property, plant and equipment (PPE) divided by total assets.  
Log_asset The natural logarithm of a firm’s total asset.  
Board_Size The number of directors on a firm's board. 
Rating A numeric rank of S&P credit ratings.  We assign 1 to AAA, 
2 to AA+, 3 to AA and etc. For firms without credit ratings, 
we follow the approach in Beaver et al. (1998) to use 
accounting measures to generate credit ratings.  
Age Firm age in years. 
DCV A credit market based earnings quality measure computed as 
the Somers’ D association statistic obtained from industry-
specific probit regressions that predict credit ratings; 
industries are based on Fama and French(1997) industry 
groupings.  Specifically, for any given year, I estimate an 
ordered probit model using quarterly data in the past five 
years for each industry grouping: 
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 where Rating is constructed by assigning 1 to firms with the 
highest S&P credit rating AAA in quarter q, 2 to AA+ and so 
on.  E is EBITDA in quarter q-k divided by total assets at the 
beginning of the quarter. COV is interest coverage in quarter 
q-k (EBITDA divided by total interest expense). LEVERAGE 
is the long-term debt in quarter q-k divided by total assets. 
NW is common equity in quarter q-k divided by total assets. 
Each regression requires at least 100 firm-quarter 
observations. DCV is measured as Somers’s D, a goodness-
of-fit statistic. 
Opacity A measure of a firm's financial reporting opacity. To obtain 
this measure, I first multiply DCV by -1, then rank this DCV 
into deciles, and then divide it by nine to convert the decile 
rank to a zero to one range. 
Opacity_Net An indicator that equals one if firms in a borrower's board 
network are on average opaque, and zero otherwise. Firm 
opacity is measured based on DCV.  I calculate the average 
DCV value for all firms in the borrowers’ board network.  I 
then multiply this average DCV  by –1 such that a high value 
of DCV indicates an opaque financial reporting system.  
Observations that are in the top quintile of this transformed 
average DCV value are classified as having high network 
opacity. 
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